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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
JUDGMENT IN REM-DECREE VESTING TITLE TO REALTY-Plain-
tiff contracted to purchase realty and when the defendant refused
to convey the property he was formally placed in default and suit
instituted for specific performance. The district court ordered the
defendant to transfer title to the property and the Orleans Court
of Appeal in affirming held that if the defendant refused to trans-
fer title, "then the judgment itself will constitute title." Bonfield
v. Tichenor, 189 So. 635 (La. App. 1939).
Specific performance is a doctrine that developed under
the common law maxim aequitas agit in personam;l but this old
maxim has been giving ground rapidly under modem statutory
developments.2 In decrees for the specific performance of con-
tracts for the conveyance of realty, court orders were originally
enforced by threats of imprisonment or sequestration of the de-
fendant's property if he did not personally convey the land.8
Today a great majority of states have so-called in rem statutes
falling into two general categories. The first type provides that
some functionary of the court, generally called a commissioner or
master, be appointed to execute and deliver a conveyance of the
property.4 The second type provides either that, if the defendant
should refuse or neglect to comply with a decree requiring him
to make a conveyance, such decree should operate ex proprio
vigore to create, transfer, or vest the intended right, title or in-
terest in the proper party; or simply that the court should have
power to vest title automatically and instantly by its decree.5
Many jurisdictions have broadened their legislation so as to in-
1. For an elaborate discussion of this maxim see 1 Lawrence, Equity
Jurisprudence (1929) 96-108, §§ 63-72.
2. Huston, The Enforcement of Decrees in Equity (1915) presents an
excellent treatise on the history and operation of these statutes.
3. McClintock, Handbook of Equity (1936) 19-23, §§ 16-17; Walsh, A
Treatise on Equity (1930) 45-49, § 10.
4. Ark. Civ. Code Ann. (Crawford, 1934) § 428; Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-
Hurd, '1935) c. 22, § 46; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 3-1001; Iowa Code
(1935) § 11613; Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) art. 16, § 98; Pa. Stat. (Purdon,
1936) tit. 21, § 53; R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) § 4956; Va. Code Ann. (Michie,
1930) § 6296; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 605; Wis. Stat. (1935)
§ 269.07.
This type of statute is also found in England. See Huston, supra note
2, at 13-20.
5. Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1928) § 6850; Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Struck-
meyer, 1928) § 3837; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 5455; Fla. Com. Gen. Laws
Ann. (Skillman, 1927) § 4952; Ga. Code (1933) § 37-1202; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930)
c. 123, § 15; Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 183, § 43; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929)
§ 14522; Mo. Stat.'Ann. (1932) § 1089; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) § 20-1304; N. C.
Code Ann. (Michie, 1935) § 608; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1926) § 11590;
Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) § 10594; Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon,
1938) art. 2214; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 1320; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1932)
§ 3761; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 89-2211.
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clude both types, thus presenting their courts with two methods
of enforcing their decrees."
Louisiana is probably the only state in which title to real
estate is vested by judicial decree without the aid of an in rem
statute. The principal case is in accord with a series of Louisiana
decisions which have established the power of our courts to frame
their judgments so as to be self-executory, transferring the title
of realty from the defendant to the plaintiff without any convey-
ance or action on the part of the former.7
In Louisiana the civil law is the general source of jurispru-
dence and the dual system of courts, that is, common law and
chancery, has never prevailed. Nor have the limitations of the
common law equity maxims weighed very heavily upon the dis-
cretion of Louisiana courts.8 These facts may account for the
practical approach to this problem, whereby the Louisiana courts
have asserted an inherent, independent power to grant in rem
relief. In the leading case of Dey v. Nelken,9 the Supreme Court
of Louisiana, in recognizing this doctrine, declared, "There is no
question but that, where the obligation is 'to do,' the one upon
whom the obligation rests can be constrained to a legal perform-
ance not personally, but by the court's recognition of the right,
and, in the event of his refusal to execute specific performance,
by decreeing that the judgment shall be the title."
W.R.C.
6. Kan. Civ. Code Ann. (Dassler, 1931) c. 83, § 1; Miss. Code Ann. (1930)
§ 456; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) § 8797; N. M. Stat. Ann. (Courtright,
1929) § 117-117; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1936) tit. 12, § 687.
7. Mason v. Benedict, 43 La. Ann. 397, 8 So. 930 (1891); Dey v. Nelken,
131 La. 154, 59 So. 104 (1912); Kinberger v. Drouet, 149 La. 986, 90 So. 367
(1922). In this last named case the court decreed that ". . . upon her failure,
or refusal to accept said tender [of the purchase price], and to execute and
deliver said deed to the plantiff . . . within said delay, then it is ordered
that this decree shall stand as a title translative of said property. (149
La. at 1000, 90 So. at 372.)
8. "Of the eighty-four cases which have invoked Article 21 of the three
Louisiana Civil Codes, the majority-the very great majority-have applied
this codal provision in exactly the manner intended by the redactors. In
such cases, not only has there been no adoption of the principles of Anglo-
American equity, but there has been no reference whatever thereto. In four
of the cases in which this codal provision was invoked, the supreme court
held expressly that equity precedents were not controlling, and refused to
adopt them." Daggett, Dainow, Hebert, McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised:
A Brief for the Civil Law of Louisiana (1937) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 12, 30.
See also LeBlanc v. New Orleans, 138 La. 243, 70 So. 212 (1915). Cf. Haas,
Does Equity as it Prevails in Common Law Jurisdictions Obtain in the Civil
Law State of Louisiana? (1928) 62 Am. L. Rev. 430.
9. 131 La. 154, 158, 59 So. 104, 106 (1912).
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